Republic of the
Supreme Court
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HOUSE OF SARA LEE, |
G.R.
No. 149013 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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PANGANIBAN, C.J., (Chairperson) |
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- versus - |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO, SR. and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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CYNTHIA
F. REY, |
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Respondent. |
Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51653
which affirmed the Decision dated October 29, 1998 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC); and the CA Resolution[2]
dated July 4, 2001 which denied the petitioner's[3]
Motion for Reconsideration.
The
case originated from a Complaint for illegal dismissal instituted on
The essential facts:
The House of Sara Lee (petitioner) is
engaged in the direct selling of a variety of product lines for men and women,
including cosmetics, intimate apparels, perfumes, ready to wear clothes and
other novelty items, through its various outlets nationwide. In the pursuit of its business, the
petitioner engages and contracts with dealers to sell the aforementioned
merchandise. These dealers, known either
as “Independent Business Managers” (IBMs) or “Independent Group Supervisors”
(IGSs), depending on whether they sell individually or through their own group,
would obtain at discounted rates the merchandise from the petitioner on credit
and then sell the same products to their own customers at fixed prices also
determined by the petitioner. In turn,
the dealers are paid “Services Fees,” or sales commissions, the amount of which
depends on the volume and value of their sales.
Under existing company policy, the dealers must remit to the petitioner
the proceeds of their sales within a designated credit period, which would
either be 38 days for IGSs or 52 days for IBMs, counted from the day the said
dealers acquired the merchandise from the petitioner. To discourage late remittances, the
petitioner imposes a “Credit Administration Charge,” or simply, a penalty
charge, on the value of the unremitted payment.
Additionally, if the dealer concerned has overdue payments or is said to
be in “default,” he or she cannot purchase additional products from the
petitioner. The dealers under this
system earn income through a profit margin between the discounted purchase
price they pay on credit to the petitioner and the fixed selling price their customers
will have to pay. On top of this margin,
the dealer is given the Service Fee, a sales commission, based on the volume of
sales generated by him or her. Due to
the sheer volume of sales generated by all of its outlets, the petitioner has
found the need to strictly monitor the 38- or 52-day “rolling due date” of each
of its IBMs and IGSs through the employment of “Credit Administration
Supervisors” (CAS) for each branch. The
primary duty of the CAS is to strictly monitor each of these deadlines, to
supervise the credit and collection of payments and outstanding accounts due to
the petitioner from its independent dealers and various customers, and to
screen prospective IBMs. To discharge
these responsibilities, the CAS is provided with a computer equipped with
control systems through which data is readily generated. Under this organizational setup, the CAS is
under the direct and immediate supervision of the Branch Operations Manager
(BOM).
Cynthia Rey (respondent), at the time
of her dismissal from employment, or on
Sometime in June 1995, while
respondent was still working in Butuan City, she allegedly instructed the Accounts
Receivable Clerk of the Cagayan de Oro outlet, a certain Ms. Magi Caroline
Mendoza, to change the credit term of one of the IBMs of the petitioner, a
certain Ms. Mariam Rey-Petilla, who happens to be respondent’s sister-in-law,
from the 52-day limit to an “unauthorized” term of 60 days. The respondent made the instruction, the
petitioner avers, just before the computer data for the computation of the
Service Fee accruing to Ms. Rey-Petilla was about to be generated. Ms. Mendoza then reported this allegedly
unauthorized act of respondent to her Branch Operations Manager, Mr.
Villagracia. Acting on the report, as
the petitioner alleges, BOM Villagracia discreetly verified the records and
discovered that it was not only the 52-day credit term of IBM Rey-Petilla that
had been extended by the respondent, but there were several other IBMs whose
credit terms had been similarly extended beyond the periods allowed by company
policy. BOM Villagracia then summoned
the respondent and required her to explain the unauthorized credit
extensions. The petitioner alleges that
during that confrontation, respondent admitted her infractions and begged the
BOM not to elevate or disclose the matter further to higher authorities. In a letter dated
As a consequence of the discovery of
the foregoing alleged “anomalous practice” of extending the credit terms of
certain IBMs, management undertook an audit of the Cagayan de Oro City and
x x x x
OBJECTIVE
OF THE AUDIT UNDERTAKEN
This activity has been conducted to establish
facts that would determine whether Ms. Cynthia Rey did change the credit terms
or not for whatever reason resulting in the company’s payments of undue
service fees.
AUDIT FINDINGS
We conducted examination of Service Fee
Report for 15 selected IBMs with the largest service fee pay-outs from November
1993 up to April 1995 for Cagayan de
Oro Branch and from February 1995 to March 1995 for Butuan Service Center. Set forth are the results of this activity:
CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH
FINDING
In all 15 samples, credit terms were changed
by then CAS Cynthia Rey beyond 52 days to as high as 90 days as evidenced by
the IBM Credit Terms Exception Report . . . . The exception report revealed
that the CAS with User ID “credit1” often changes/increases the credit terms of
several IBMs, since February 1994, usually a day before or during SF cut-off
dates (20th, 21st, 22nd, or 23rd of
the month) and would return it to original credit terms after completion of SF
print-outs. Total SF discrepancy for the 15 samples as a result of credit term
adjustment amounts to P 211K x x x x
It is apparent that credit term adjustments
resulted in payment of significant amount of undue service fees. Such fraudulent practice clearly favors the
interest of the IBMs to the detriment of the company. This constitutes conflict of interest and
should be dealt with accordingly.
x x x
FINDING
Ms. Cynthia Rey was on maternity leave from
x x x x
FINDING
On a concurrent capacity as OIC and CAS of
Butuan Service Center starting sometime February 1995, Ms. Cynthia Rey changed
the credit terms of IBMs as shown in the IBM Credit Terms Exception Report . .
. . Total discrepancies for February and March 1995 Service Fees as a result of
the credit term adjustments amounts to P3,716.44 . . . . Analysis showed that
credit terms used by Cynthia for each of the IBMs/IBMC/IGSs ranged from 55 to
90 days x x x x
Surprised with
the Exception Reports, Ms. Rey admitted having done the credit term adjustments
at Butuan. Her statements therefore
showed inconsistencies as she previously denied this allegation. However, she cited no clear reasons for such
malpractice.
Recommendation
Materiality of the amount involved is not the
issue at hand. Her admission to the
auditor of the violation committed does not absolve her from being meted
disciplinary actions as determined by management. We would like to emphasize that any leniency
on this case might have far reaching implications to the branch operations and
the company as a whole.
x
x x.[8]
Petitioner, on
Meanwhile, on
On the basis of the hearing, the
alleged voluntary admissions of respondent, and the findings of the auditor’s
report, the petitioner, on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioner] House of Sara Lee to immediately pay [respondent] Cynthia F. Rey the sum of P177,052.05 as full backwages from July 1, 1996 up to the date of this decision; 13th month pay in the sum of P18,666.67 and separation pay in the sum of P40,000.00 and likewise to pay the sum of P23,571.72 equivalent to 10% of the aggregate monetary award as attorney’s fees.
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
To the Labor Arbiter, the question to
be resolved is whether the petitioner validly terminated respondent’s
employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. In declaring the termination illegal, the
Labor Arbiter held that the petitioner, as employer, failed to discharge its
burden of proof in showing that the dismissal was for a just or authorized
cause; that, in particular, the petitioner failed to establish that respondent
was the very person who allegedly manipulated the credit terms of certain IBMs
through the computer terminals, since other employees had access to the same;
that respondent’s alleged admissions before Villagracia, her BOM, and M.D.
Sabayle, the company auditor, are based on self-serving evidence; that the
petitioner failed to substantiate the loss of P211,000.00 which it
imputed to the respondent; that the petitioner failed to show that it apprised
its employees of the terms of the company policy which respondent allegedly
violated, or, in other words, that respondent was not fully informed of the possible
sanctions for such acts; that reinstatement would be impractical under the
circumstances since the relations of the parties were already strained, hence,
the award of full backwages and separation pay is justified; that petitioner
failed to refute the claim for 13th month pay, hence, as a statutory
relief, respondent should be awarded the same; and that the claims for 14th
and 15th month pay as well as moral and exemplary damages should be
denied for having no legal basis.
Aggrieved,
the petitioner appealed to the NLRC. On
The
petitioner appealed to the CA under Rule 65.
On
The
petitioner is now before this Court under Rule 45, assigning the following
errors:
I.
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ASSAILING
THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IN THE LABOR CASE
BELOW ON THE GROUND THAT FACTUAL ISSUES ARE NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT OF
CERTIORARI, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS IN EFFECT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
IN DOING SO, THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM
ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES LONG SETTLED BY CONSISTENT JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.[15]
We grant the petition.
As a preliminary matter, we shall resolve the
procedural concern raised by the respondent.
She maintains that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
NLRC. This is incorrect.
In the recent case of Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado,[16] we held that where the
NLRC or the labor arbiter acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard
of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, the extraordinary
writ of certiorari will lie.[17] While as a general rule, the factual findings
of administrative agencies are not subject to review by this Court, it is
equally established that we will not uphold erroneous conclusions which are
contrary to the evidence, because the agency a quo, for that
reason, would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Nor is this Court bound by conclusions which
are not supported by substantial evidence.[18] The substantial evidence rule does not
authorize any finding just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative agencies
from considering contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence
supporting a finding.[19]
In this case, the NLRC and the CA consistently
ignored the following facts established in the record:
a) respondent, during the formal hearing
on September 7, 1995, in the presence of her counsel, clearly admitted in
several instances that, beginning June 1994, she herself actually extended, on
a monthly basis, the credit terms of certain IBMs from the company-fixed 52
days to as high as 90 days;[20]
b) as Credit Administration Supervisor,
she knew the appropriate credit terms (38 days for IGSs and 52 days for IBMs)
under the company guidelines and which would serve as the bases for the
computation of the correct Service Fees or sales commissions;[21]
c) she was fully aware of the financial
implications whenever she would extend the credit terms, in that all late
remittances by the IBMs concerned would be considered in the computation of
their Service Fees which would not otherwise be due to them under company
guidelines;[22]
d) the computation of the Service Fees,
on many occasions, had been finalized, processed, and printed out;[23]
e) she changed the credit terms in the
Cagayan de Oro branch under the alleged “blanket approval” of BOM Villagracia;[24]
f) she changed the credit terms in the
Cagayan de Oro branch since it was a “standard practice” in
g) during her
stint in the Butuan City branch, she admitted that there had been no such
“blanket approval,” but she nonetheless kept changing the credit terms because,
according to her, this had become “standard practice” in the Cagayan de Oro
branch as well;[26]
h) in several
instances, she acted on her own accord and without the requisite authority in
extending the credit terms, since there were no specific nor direct
instructions from Villagracia to change those terms;[27]
i) she even
assisted Mr. Villagracia and Ms. Mendoza in the process of changing the credit
terms since they were ignorant of the procedure;[28]
j) she would
change the credit terms whenever the IBMs concerned would ask for
“reconsideration;”[29] and finally,
k) her statements suffered notable
inconsistencies, oscillating between denying or not remembering the alleged act
and categorically admitting having done them.[30]
The
consideration of the foregoing facts, as disclosed in the record, justifies a
different conclusion. Although numerous
exceptions to the general rule have been fairly established in case law, it must be stressed that the
meticulous constitution of the factual findings are
functions that principally lie with the NLRC and the CA as well as the other
tribunals that may come under the review power of the Supreme Court. It is a strict judicial policy to hand down
an incisive ruling in the first instance in order to relieve this Court from
exercising its extraordinary powers of excavating the facts, so that the
Court may thoroughly devote its energies to the disposition
of questions of law, and only questions of law, under the extent of Rule 45.
Contrary
to the findings of the NLRC and the CA, the Court
holds that respondent was dismissed for a just cause.
Law[31] and jurisprudence have
long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss
of trust and confidence.[32] More so, in the case of supervisors or
personnel occupying positions of responsibility, loss of trust justifies
termination.[33] Loss of confidence as a just cause for
dismissal is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position
of trust and confidence. This situation applies where a person is entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employer’s property.
But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be “work-related,” such that the employee concerned is unfit
to continue working for the employer.[34]
The degree
of proof required in labor cases is not as stringent as in other types of
cases.[35] It must be noted, however, that recent
decisions of this Court have distinguished the treatment of managerial employees
from that of rank-and-file personnel in the application of the doctrine of loss
of trust and confidence.[36] With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss
of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of
involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated
assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But as to a managerial employee, the mere
existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of
his employer would suffice for his dismissal.
Hence, in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required; it is sufficient that there is some basis for the loss
of confidence, as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his position.[37]
In the
present case, the respondent is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. The nature of her work requires a substantial
amount of trust and confidence on the part of the employer. Being the Credit Administration Supervisor of the
Cagayan de Oro and
Clearly, respondent’s position
involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence. The position carried with it the duty to
observe proper company procedures in the fulfillment of her job, as it relates
closely to the financial interests of the company. Respondent’s unauthorized extensions of the
credit periods of the dealers are prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner
and bear serious financial implications: First,
the dealer concerned is allowed to withhold remittances to the company for his
or her credit purchases beyond the expiration of the 38- or 52-day rolling
deadline; second, the Credit
Administration Charges or interest penalties are not imposed on the erring
dealer; third, the dealer concerned
is allowed to purchase goods on credit despite the fact that he or she has not
remitted payment, which is against company policy; and fourth, undue Service Fees were unknowingly paid by the company to
certain IBMs. Moreover, respondent was
not guilty of one-time unauthorized extension of the credit terms, but of
repeated acts over the course of several months. Her bare, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated
denial of her participation in the anomalies does not prove her innocence nor
disprove her alleged guilt,[38] especially
considering that she would vacillate between admitting and denying the
charges. On the contrary, such denial or
failure to rebut the serious accusations hurled against her militate against
her innocence and strengthen the adverse averments of the petitioner.[39] The requirement that there must be some basis
or reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct was sufficiently met in this case.
The
NLRC and the CA held that there were other co-employees who had access to the
same computer terminals, hence, it cannot be pinpointed who was
responsible. Even if this is true, as
respondent argues, this point is not material.
It must be stressed that the respondent was the Credit Administration
Supervisor, one tasked to directly supervise each and every collectible due to
the petitioner. Recently, this Court has
held that even if the employee had no actual and direct participation in the
alleged anomalies, his failure to detect any anomaly that would normally fall
within the scope of his work reflects his ineffectiveness and amounts to gross
negligence and incompetence, which are, likewise, justifiable grounds for his
dismissal; and that it is not necessary to prove the employee’s direct
participation in the irregularity, for what is material is that his actuations
were more than sufficient to sow in his employer the seed of mistrust and loss
of confidence.[40] The records show that respondent, by her very
own admission, actually participated in the foregoing irregularities. Although the petitioner could not directly
and wholly attribute the monetary loss of P211,000.00 linked to the 15
samples as reflected in the Auditor’s Report, to the actuations of the
respondent, it is conceded in all quarters that the repeated and unauthorized
extensions of the credit terms no doubt have serious financial implications
that affect the company as a whole.
Whether the petitioner was financially prejudiced is immaterial.[41] What matters is not the amount involved,
rather, it is the fraudulent scheme in which the respondent was involved, and
which constitutes a clear betrayal of trust and confidence. In fact, there are indications that these
acts had been done before, and probably would have continued had it not been
discovered.[42]
The
Court is not impressed with respondent’s claim that Villagracia, her BOM at
that time, “cleverly pinned her down” as the culprit; that he deleted from the
computer files all the credit extensions that took place; and that he “created
a scenario” for a graceful exit. There
is nothing in the record that would substantiate these bare allegations. Nor can the Court accept respondent’s
assertion that she was never apprised of the company policies with respect to
the allowable credit terms. As Credit Administration Supervisor, the
respondent cannot feign ignorance of the irregularity as she was sufficiently
aware that the credit extensions she made were beyond acceptable limits. By her very own admission, and in the
presence of her counsel, she was fully aware of the company-fixed rolling due
dates for the dealers and that their commissions were to be determined by their
timely remittances of the sales proceeds.
In other words, respondent was aware of the financial implications of
her extension of the credit terms, especially the outcome where the
consideration of late remittances, after the extension, would unduly inflate
the sales commissions. It is also an
established fact that the petitioner, to ensure the correct computation of the
commissions, installed internal control systems in the computer terminals and
that respondent, through “practice” and “experience,” acquired the proficiency
and computer literacy as to be able to override these control systems in order
to make the changes[43]
in clear deviation from company policy.
But
the respondent, quoting the agencies a
quo, insists that her extensions of the credit terms of certain dealers
were predicated on a “long standing policy” in the Cagayan de Oro branch, and
that this “arrangement” had the “blessings of the manager.” She did not prove these allegations. While case law provides that where a
violation of company policy or breach of company rules and regulations was
found to have been tolerated by management, then the same could not serve as a
basis for termination,[44]
in this case respondent failed to show that her extensions of the credit terms
were condoned by management. Her BOM,
Mr. Villagracia, categorically denied that he had given her the requisite and
direct authority to change the credit terms.
When the respondent, while in
Respondent
argues that the loss of trust and confidence as Credit Administration
Supervisor had been effectively negated by the fact that she was made to occupy
the position of Branch Operations Manager for three months immediately after
Villagracia resigned. This act of the
petitioner, respondent reasons, is an express recognition of her capability and
integrity or trustworthiness as an employee.[47] To support this contention, she adduces
several cash advance slips which she signed as BOM as evidence of her
appointment.[48] Even in light of this “promotion,” it must be
noted that at the time she occupied this position, which the petitioner asserts
was done in an acting capacity only, the investigation over the anomalies
committed by respondent had been pending.
The Memorandum dated August 21, 1995 reinstating respondent and granting
her request to conduct a formal investigation with the presence of counsel
expressly stated that the reinstatement is “without prejudice” to “a
reinvestigation” of her case.[49] Pending the final outcome of the
investigation, respondent, as with all persons, has in her favor the
presumption of innocence, and for this reason she may even be entitled to a
promotion in due course. But after due
investigation and marshalling of facts, after the employer forms a moral
conviction that indeed the employee breached its trust and confidence, and
despite such promotion, the employer may then proceed to dismiss the erring
employee.
As
stated, the rules on termination of employment and the penalties for infractions,
insofar as fiduciary employees are concerned, are not necessarily the same as
those applicable to the termination of employment of ordinary employees. Employers, generally, are allowed a wider
latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial personnel or
those of similar rank performing functions which by their nature require the
employer’s trust and confidence, than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file
employees.[50] There can be no doubt that the respondent’s
continuance in the sensitive fiduciary position of Credit Administration
Supervisor would be patently inimical to the interests of the petitioner. It would be oppressive and unjust to order
the petitioner to take her back, for the law, in protecting the rights of the
employee, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[51]
The award
of 13th month pay must be deleted.
Respondent is not a rank-and-file employee and is, therefore, not
entitled to thirteenth-month pay.[52]
However,
the NLRC and the CA are correct in refusing to award 14th and 15th
month pay as well as the “monthly salary increase of 10 percent per year for
two years based on her latest salary rate.”
The respondent must show that these benefits are due to her as a matter
of right.[53] The rule in these cases is, she who alleges,
not she who denies, must prove. Mere
allegations by the respondent do not suffice in the absence of proof supporting
the same.[54] With respect to salary increases in
particular, the respondent must likewise show that she has a vested right to
the same, such that her salary increases can be made a component in the
computation of backwages. What is
evident is that salary increases are a mere expectancy. They are by nature volatile and dependent on
numerous variables, including the company’s fiscal situation, the employee’s
future performance on the job, or the employee’s continued stay in a position.[55] In short, absent any proof, there is no
vested right to salary increases.[56]
The claims
for moral and exemplary damages, as correctly held by the NLRC and the CA,
should be denied for having no basis in fact and law.[57] The award of attorney’s fees should likewise
be deleted for the same reason.[58]
And last, the Court is constrained to delete
the award of separation pay. Well-settled
is the rule that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where
the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or
those reflecting on her moral character.[59] Inasmuch as the reason for which the
respondent was validly separated involves her integrity, which is required for
the position of Credit Administration Supervisor, she is not worthy of
compassion as to deserve separation pay for her length of service.[60]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DECLARING
respondent’s dismissal valid. The
complaint of respondent is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eloy
R.
[2]
[3] The
name of the petitioner as a party-in-interest should read “Sara Lee
Philippines, Inc.” which is the legal entity that owns and manages the business
and its various divisions. See rollo, pp. 77. The caption
may also read “Sara Lee Philippines, Inc., doing
business under the name and style House of Sara Lee.”
[4] Rollo, p. 102-103.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
G.R. No. 167118,
[17] Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., citing Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 331 Phil. 278 (1996).
[18] Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC v. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 Phil. 635, 645 (1997); Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183, 196.
[19] Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.
[20] Minutes of the Formal Investigation, September 7, 1995, at 10-12, 20-23, 49, 67, 70, rollo, pp. 119-121, 129-132, 158, 176, 179.
[21]
[22]
[23] Minutes of the Formal Investigation, September 7, 1995, at 24-27, 29-31, 33-35, 41, 53, 67, rollo, pp. 133-136, 138-140, 142-144, 150, 162, 176.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Id. at 11, 34-35, 47-48, 54, 71; rollo, pp. 120, 143-144, 156-157, 163, 180.
[28] Minutes of the Formal Investigation,
[29]
[30] See, e.g., id. at 5, 10, 33-34, 41-42, 44-45, 47, 49-50, 53, 55-56, 59-60; rollo, pp. 114, 119, 142-143, 150-151, 153-154, 156, 158-159, 162, 164-165, 168-169.
[31] The Labor Code provides:
Art. 282. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
x x x x
(c) Fraud or willful breach
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly-authorized
representative.
x x x x
[32] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 148410, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 516, 528-529, citing Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, 359 Phil. 399, 406 (1998).
[33]
Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio
Lines, Inc., supra, citing Kwikway Engineering Works v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No.
85014, March 22, 1991, 195 SCRA 526, 529, citing Lamsan Trading, Inc. v. Leogardo,Jr., 228 Phil. 542, 547 (1986); New Frontier Mines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 214 Phil. 443 (1984); Associated Citizens Bank v. Ople, No. L-48896,
[34] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra, citing Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, id.
[35] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra, citing Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 80728, February 4, 1990, 182 SCRA 446.
[36]
Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 148544,
[37] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra, citing Caoile v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra; Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, id.
[38] See Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission, 390 Phil. 1228, 1241 (2000).
[39]
[40] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc, supra.
[41] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra.
[42]
[43] Minutes of the Formal Investigation, September 7, 1995, at 12, 48-50, 52, 54, 59-61, 65; rollo, pp. 121, 157-159, 161, 163, 168-170, 174;
[44] See Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Vital, G.R. No. 154384, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 277, 283; Permex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 79, 87 (2000), citing Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Victory Employees and Laborers’ Association, 85 Phil 166 (1949).
[45]
Minutes of the Formal
Investigation,
[46]
[47] Rollo, p. 197.
[48]
[49] Rollo, p. 108.
[50] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra, citing Gonzales v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 195, 208.
[51]
See San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 200 Phil. 725, 729-730 (1982).
[52] See
Salafranca v. Philamlife Village Homeowners Association, Inc.,360 Phil.
652, 668 (1998).
[53]
See Equitable-PCI Bank v.
Sadac, G.R. No. 164772,
[54]
[55]
[56] See Equitable-PCI Bank v. Sadac, id.
[57]
See Civil Code of the
[58]
See Labor Code of the
[59]
Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio
Lines, Inc., supra note 32, citing Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, No. L-80609,
[60] Etcuban, Jr. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., supra note 32, citing Pacaña v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 83513, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 473.